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Executive Summary
• If current demographic trends continue the
Scottish population will decline in size and will
continue to age rapidly.
• The Scottish Executive recognises that popula-
tion decline/ageing is problematic.
• If left unchecked it will likely lead to a decline
in the standard of living of the Scottish people.
• The Scottish Executive is committed to
increasing immigration through such policy
measures as the Fresh Talent Initiative.
• This report evaluates the impact that increased
net migration would have on population
decline and population ageing.
• A series of population projections covering the
period 2001 to 2041 are performed.
• In the projections specific assumptions are
made about the number of net migrants and
the age distribution of the net migrant popula-
tion.
• These assumptions are intended to approxi-
mate a successful immigration policy that
increases net migration by attracting younger
workers with children to Scotland.
• The main conclusion is that such a targeted
immigration policy that attracts such individu-
als in sufficient numbers would both stop
population decline and have a sizeable
decelerating effect on population ageing.
• The numbers of immigrants required to
achieve these objectives is, however, not small.
• The responsibility for immigration needs to be
transferred to the devolved governments.
Robert E Wright
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1 Introduction
In its simplest interpretation, population ageing is
the increase in the average or median age of a
population. It is the process by which there is a
redistribution of relative population shares away
from the younger to the older age groups. Popula-
tion ageing is ultimately caused by the interaction of
the four main demographic variables—fertility,
mortality, immigration and emigration—with
fertility being the main determinant. Like most
high-income industrialised countries, the popula-
tion of Scotland is expected to age rapidly over the
next few decades.
The ageing of the Scottish population will lead to an
increase in the number of individuals of pension-
able age and a decrease in the number of individu-
als of working age. This will lead to a large increase
in the demand for state-supplied health care,
residential services, housing, pensions and other
services consumed by the elderly. Unfortunately at
the same time, the base expected to pay for this
increase—essentially people of working age—will
become progressively smaller both in absolute
numbers and in relative population share. That is,
those “demanding” will increase while those
“supplying” will decrease. It is not hard to imagine
that such a situation of increasing imbalance is
unsustainable in the long-run and some will argue
that cracks caused by population ageing in Scot-
land’s “pay-as-you-go” welfare system are already
starting to show.
There is a growing consensus that the Scottish
Executive will soon find itself without the necessary
“The single biggest challenge facing Scotland as we move further in the 21st century is our
falling population.”
Jack McConnell, First Minister, Scottish Executive, February 2004
Figure 1 Population size Scotland 1951-2001
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resources to accommodate the changes in the
expected demand for public services and other
welfare benefits targeted at the elderly caused by
population ageing (see Wright, 2002a). Neverthe-
less, they will be expected to increase expenditure in
these areas in order to ensure that the living
standard of this numerically increasing segment of
the population does not fall. As a population ages so
does its electorate, and older people compared to
younger people have much higher rates of participa-
tion in elections at all levels of government. The
dilemma facing politicians is that if they do not—or
cannot—accommodate the demands of their ageing
electorate they will suffer dearly at the ballot box. A
“greying electorate” will not vote en masse for
politicians who they believe are ignoring their
interests. It is, therefore, perhaps not surprising
that the current cohort of politicians have recently
started to comment in public that Scotland may
have a “population problem”.
There is a large and growing literature concerned
with the economic consequences of population
ageing (see Weil, 1997 for an excellent review). For
example, research has considered the impact on key
labour market variables such as productivity,
earnings, employment, unemployment, mobility,
migration, retirement and educational participation
(see Wright, 2002b for some Scottish evidence).
Likewise, serious attention has been directed
towards evaluating the effect of population ageing
on savings, consumption, housing and
intergenerational transfers. It is safe to conclude
that not all the effects of population ageing are
negative. For example, it is clear that population
ageing will increase the demand for services
consumed by older people (e.g. residential care) but
at the same time will decrease the demand for
services consumed by younger people (e.g. school-
ing). There is considerable debate surrounding what
the net effect of such changes will be on key
economic variables such as economic growth. It
could be the case that the resources which are saved
when schools are closed and teachers are shed
might counterbalance the resources spent on
expanding Scotland’s system of residential care for
the elderly.
The purpose of this report is not to place Scotland
in the context of the many themes that make up the
Figure 2 Population growth Scotland 1951-2001
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debate concerning the economic and social
consequences of population ageing. My starting
position is that population ageing is both undesir-
able and problematic and if unchecked will lead to a
substantial and sustained fall in the standard of
living of the Scottish people. Such a starting
position, although pessimistic, is not unrealistic
when one considers the problems faced by other
countries having to cope with changes brought
about by population ageing (with Germany at the
moment perhaps being the best example). This
report examines what public policy action can be
taken to decelerate the population ageing process.
More specifically, this report evaluates the impact
that a successful “Scottish-specific” immigration
policy that leads to a sizable increase in net
migration levels could have.
The remainder of this report is organised as follows.
Section 2 examines past trends in the four main
demographic variables mentioned above—fertility,
mortality, immigration and emigration. The
purpose of this section is to describe the mecha-
nisms that are “causing” the Scottish population to
age. Section 3 is concerned with one future, which
is the continuation of the status quo. More specifi-
cally, it examines what will happen if current
demographic trends continue. Section 4 examines a
set of alternative futures. In this section, a set of
population projections are carried out under
different assumptions relating to the level of net
migration. The analysis is intended to approximate
a successful immigration policy that increases net
migration by attracting younger workers with
children to Scotland. Conclusions and policy
implications follow in Section 5.
2 Current demographic situation
in Scotland1
It is worth describing clearly at the outset the
mechanisms that cause a population to change in
size. Below is what demographers usually refer to as
the “population growth identity”:
∆N  = B - D + I  - E
where: “∆N” is change in population size (N); “B” is
the number of births; “D” is the number of deaths;
“I” is the number of immigrants and “E” is the
number of emigrants. From this identity there are
two ways a population can grow or decline. The first
Figure 3 Total fertility rate Scotland, 1951-2001
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is by “natural increase” (B-D), which is simply the
difference between the number of births and
deaths. The second is by “net migration” (I - E),
which is simply the difference between the number
of immigrants (i.e. individuals entering a country)
and emigrants (i.e. individuals leaving a country).
Figure 1 shows the size of the Scottish population
over the period 1951 to 2001. Several features about
this trend are worth noting. The first is that
throughout this period the population has remained
above five million (also shown in Figure 1). The
second is that in this period the absolute size of the
Scottish population has not varied much. The third
is the current size of the population is about the
same as in 1951. In other words, throughout this
period, the average rate of population growth was
effectively zero. This is confirmed in Figure 2 which
shows the year-on-year annual rate of population
growth. In this period the rate of growth never
exceeded one-half of a per cent per year. In fact, in
many years population growth was negative,
especially in the period 1975 to 1990. In order to
understand this pattern of “no growth” it is essential
to examine the trends in fertility, mortality and net
migration during the period.
2.1. Fertility
Figure 3 shows the total fertility rate for the period
1951 to 2002. This is a period measure of fertility
that summarized the number of children that a
woman would be expected to have if she passed
through the child-bearing years of age 15 to 49
bearing children at the rates that prevail in any
particular year. Also shown in this figure is the so-
called “replacement level” of fertility of approxi-
mately 2.1 live births per woman. This is the level of
fertility required so that the number of births equals
the number of deaths and the population size
remains constant (assuming zero net migration).
Scotland, in keeping with most other industrialised
countries, experienced a sharp increase in fertility
in the 1950s and 1960s. In these so-called “baby
boom’ years, fertility was well above the replacement
level, with the total fertility rate peaking at around
3.2 births per woman in 1965. However, since then,
the trend has been downwards. More importantly
since about 1975, fertility has been below the
replacement level. The current level of fertility is
about 35 per cent below the replacement level and
this represents a halving of the total fertility rate
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since the peak of the baby boom. It is also worth
noting that over the past two decades, the total
fertility rate in Scotland has been below that for the
United Kingdom and is currently the lowest of the
four countries that constitute the United Kingdom.2
2.2 Mortality
As in most industrialised countries, in the past
century in Scotland there has been a considerable
decrease in mortality in all age groups. For example,
Figure 4 shows life expectancy at birth for women
and men in the period 1951 to 2001. In 1951, life
expectancy at birth was 68.7 years for women and
64.4 years for men. By 2001, it had risen to 78.6
years for women and 73.1 years for men. However,
despite this impressive progress, such changes in
mortality have not been a main determinant of
population ageing. While it is true that the fact that
older people are living longer does reinforce the
ageing process, it is not a key cause. The reason is
simply that mortality has declined at all ages and
therefore its effect on the age distribution has
largely been largely neutral.
2.3 Net Migration
Migration has also been a factor contributing to
population ageing, although like mortality, its
overall impact has been very small. Figure 5 shows
the trend in net migration—the difference between
immigrants and emigrants—for the period 1951-
2001. Throughout most of this period, the number
of emigrants was larger than the number of
immigrants, leading to population loss. However,
the current situation is effectively one of balance
where the number of immigrants is equal to the
number of emigrants. Immigrants and emigrants
tend to share many common socio-economic
characteristics, with a main one being age. On
average, both immigrants and emigrants tend to
come from the younger age groups. In other words,
in most of this period, Scotland lost more young
people than it gained, which clearly contributed to
population ageing. However, the scale of net
migration has not been particularly large when
measured relative to the total size of the population.
More specifically, in this period net migration never
exceeded one per cent of the total population (and
rarely reached one-half of a per cent). Even though
Scotland has historically been a net loser of people,
Figure 5 Net migrants Scotland, 1951-2001
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this has not been the main cause of population
ageing.
3 One demographic future -
continuation of the status quo
The current demographic situation in Scotland can
be described as a population with below replace-
ment level fertility, gradually decreasing mortality
and zero net migration.3 If these demographic
trends continue unchanged into the future, the
Scottish population will be affected in two funda-
mental ways. The first is that it will decline in
absolute size. The second is that it will continue to
age rapidly.
While it is not possible to predict the future, it is
possible to project what the age distribution of the
population will look like given a precise set of
assumptions. The most recently available set of
population projections for Scotland produced by the
Government Actuary’s Department (GAD) are based
on an extrapolation of the demographic situation
prevailing in 2001 (see GAD, 2002; GROS, 2003;
Wright, 2004).
The main assumptions needed to perform a
population projection relate to the future levels of
fertility, mortality and net migration. In the GAD’s
“principal” projection, it is assumed that a below-
replacement level total fertility rate of 1.6 live births
per women (which is slightly higher than the
current rate) will prevail indefinitely into the future.
It is assumed that mortality will continue to decline
gradually, with life expectancy at birth increasing to
82.6 years for women and to 77.6 years for men by
2041. Finally, it is assumed the net migration will be
constant at minus 1,000 people per year. The
projection period covers four decades, beginning in
2001 and ending in 2041.
Based on these assumptions, the Scottish popula-
tion will continue to decline in absolute numbers.
Figure 6 shows the projected size of the Scottish
population in the period 2001 to 2041. It will fall
below 5 million by the end of this decade. The
decline will continue with the size of the Scottish
population falling to below 4.5 million by 2041. This
four-decade decline is a reduction of over half a
million people. Put in percentage terms, by 2041
the population will be about 10 per cent smaller
than it currently is.
Figure 6 Population size Scotland 2001-2041 (GAD projection)
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One way to summarise the extent of population
ageing is to consider changes in the number and
share of people in different age groups. According
to the GAD’s projections, for example, there will
also be a large increase in the number of people
aged 65 and older and a large reduction in the
number of people aged under 15. As shown in
Figure 7, the number of people aged 65 and older is
expected to rise from about 800,000 in 2001 to
about 1.2 million by 2041—an increase of about 50
per cent. On the other hand, the number aged
under 15 is expected to fall from about 900,000 to
650,000—a decrease of about 30 per cent. As
shown in Figure 8, in percentage terms, the
population ageing process is even more dramatic.
The share aged 65 and older will increase from 16
per cent to 27 per cent of the total population while
the share aged under 15 will decrease from 18 per
cent to 14 per cent. Very soon, the population aged
65 and older will be larger than the population aged
under 15, both in absolute numbers and in percent-
age terms.
4 Other demographic futures
with increased net migration
It is clear that the Scottish Executive is concerned
with the negative economic and social conse-
quences of population decline and population
ageing. Indeed, the First Minister, Jack McConnell,
has remarked in public on numerous occasions that
population ageing/decline is Scotland’s “number
one problem” (see for example, McConnell,
2003a,b). If this is the case, then the obvious
question is, what can be done about it?
The root cause of Scotland’s population ageing/
decline is low fertility. It follows that a sustained
increase in fertility would help counteract popula-
tion ageing/decline. However, the amount that
fertility would have to increase to in order to have a
sizeable impact seems unlikely to occur, at least any
time in the near future. In order to achieve the
replacement level, the total fertility rate would have
to increase by about 35 per cent—and stay at this
level indefinitely—just to maintain the population
around the 5 million mark. Such a large increase is
possible but improbable given that fertility has
Figure 7 Population in different age groups Scotland, 2001-2041 (GAD projection)
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declined in almost every year since 1965 (see Figure
1). A drastic reversal of what is now a forty-year
trend seems unlikely, although it is worth remem-
bering that very few demographers “predicted” the
sharp increase in fertility that characterised the
post-war baby boom (see Joshi and Wright, 2004).
Under the assumption that we cannot expect large
increases in fertility in the future, the other way in
which population ageing/decline can be counter-
acted is through what I will term “targeted immigra-
tion”. That is, an immigration policy is adopted that
substantially increases net migration by attracting
young migrants to live and work in Scotland.
Indeed such a policy is reflected in the Scottish
Executive’s so-called Fresh Talent Initiative, where
one of the aims is to encourage overseas students
studying at Scottish institutes of higher education to
stay in Scotland after they graduate through the
issuing of special visas (Scottish Executive, 2004).
In my view this is a step in the right direction, but
as is noted below, the number of net migrants such
a policy is likely to generate falls well below what is
required to have a significant impact on population
ageing.
4.1 Projections
How much would net migration have to increase in
order to stop population decline and at the same
time decelerate the ageing of the population? It is
clear that increasing net migration will add people
to the Scottish population and therefore work
against population decline. However, increasing net
migration will only have an impact on population
ageing if net-migrants as a group are younger than
then the general population. If the age distribution
of net migrants is the same as the general popula-
tion then increasing net migration will have no
impact on population ageing. Therefore, the effect
on population ageing will be highly dependent on
the age distribution of migrants. It is perhaps
interesting to note that in the GAD’s projections
discussed above, the age distribution of immigrants
and emigrants is assumed to be very similar, so the
impact of net migration on the age distribution of
the population is very small (see Wright, 2004).
In order to evaluate the impact of a successful
immigration policy on population decline/ageing, a
set of population projections have been carried out.
Figure 8 Population shares in different age groups Scotland, 2001-2041 (GAD
projection)
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These projections adopt the fertility and mortality
assumptions used in the GAD’s “principal”
projection—constant below replacement fertility
coupled with gradually decreasing mortality. Where
these projections below differ markedly to those of
the GAD relates to the assumptions about net-
migration. It is assumed that net-migration by 2010
increases from the current level of about zero to
levels ranging from 10,000 to 50,000 per year. It is
further assumed that all the net-migrants are under
the age of 45, with half the number being under the
age of 20. This not only implies that net migrants as
a group are much younger on average than the
general population, this age distribution assump-
tion can be thought of as an approximation of a
policy that successfully attracts “younger workers
with children”.
4.2. Results
The results of the projections are summarised in
Figures 9 and 10.4 Figure 9 shows the size of the
Scottish population from 2001 to 2041 based on
different levels of net migration. Figure 10 shows
the percentage of the population that would be in
the aged 65 and older age group. The population
share in this age group is one summary measure of
population ageing. Table 1 presents the estimates of
population size and the share of the total population
aged 65 and older in 2041, which is the last year of
the projection. To provide a baseline to which the
alternative scenarios can be meaningfully com-
pared, a projection is also carried out that assumes
zero net migration.
Turning first to the baseline case, the results are
very similar to the GAD’s “principal projection”.
Under these assumptions, the population will
decline to about 4.5 million by 2041. If net-
migration was to increase to 10,000 per year, then
size of the population would be constant, hovering
around 5 million.5 However, net migration levels
above 10,000 per year would generate significant
population growth. The baseline case corresponds
to an average rate of population decline of about
one-quarter of a per cent per year. Net-migration of
50,000 per year would lead to a population of 6.7
million by 2041, which corresponds to an average
rate of population growth of about 0.8 per cent per
year. For completeness, net migration levels of
Figure 9 Population size Scotland, 2001-2041 different net migration assumptions
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20,000, 30,000 and 40,000 per year would lead to
populations of 5.4, 5.8, and 6.3 million, respectively,
by 2041. These values correspond to non-trivial
average rates of population growth of about 0.2, 0.4
and 0.6 per cent per year.
Net migration levels in this range will also have a
sizeable impact on population ageing. The baseline
case which assumes zero net migration suggests
that the percentage of the population aged 65 and
older will increase by 10.5 percentage points, from
15.9 per cent in 2001 to 26.4 per cent in 2041
(again very similar to the GAD’s principal projec-
tion). It is important to note that even a net
migration level of 50,000 per year will not “stop”
the process of population ageing. However, net
migration with the assumed age structure described
above would slow the process down. For example,
50,000 net migrants per year will lead to just over a
2 percentage point increase, with the share of the
population aged 65 and reaching 19.0 per cent in
2041. The effect of 10,000 migrants per year is
much smaller. Under this assumption, the percent-
age of the population aged 65 and older will reach
24.4 per cent by 2041, which is not much smaller
than the 26.4 per cent suggested by the zero net
migration baseline projection. Net migration levels
of 20,000, 30,000 and 40,000 per year suggest
that the share of the population aged 65 and older
would reach 22.7, 21.3 and 20.1 per cent, respec-
tively, by 2041.
5 Conclusions and policy implica-
tions
The main conclusion of this report is that a targeted
immigration policy which attracts young individuals
in sufficient numbers would both stop population
decline and slow population ageing. In my view, if
current demographic trends continue then popula-
tion decline and population ageing will lead to a
sizeable reduction in the standard of living of
Scottish people. Scotland in not unique in this
respect, since population ageing is a feature of most
industrialised nations. For example, the current
economic problems in Germany clearly have a
demographic dimension. The German government
at all levels is being forced to adopt a series of
Figure 10 Percentage of population aged 65+ Scotland, 2001-2041 different net
migration assumptions
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
26
28
30
2001 2006 2011 2016 2021 2026 2031 2036 2041
Year
P
er
ce
nt
ag
e
Zero +10,000 +20,000 +30,000 +40,000 +50,000
Robert E Wright
scotecon.net 14
policies aimed at radically reforming the labour
market, the pension system and the health system
since they simply do not have the resources to
maintain the current levels of provision given their
dwindling tax base. However, what is unique about
Scotland is the lack of public debate and interest in
the potential problems of population decline/
ageing. Until the establishment of the Scottish
Parliament, there was virtually no interest in
Scotland’s demography. It is somewhat telling that
in the space of a few years, population decline/
ageing has gone from being a “non-issue” to being
Scotland’s “number one problem”.
Although the simple arithmetic of population
projections suggests that immigration can stop
population decline and slow population ageing, the
difficult step is to put into place an immigration
policy that is effective. It is clear at the moment that
there is political commitment in Scotland for
increased immigration. The political desire to
increase immigration is one matter—having the
instruments in place to turn this desire into a reality
is another. Scotland needs to have what I term a
“Scottish-specific” immigration policy. In this
respect Scotland, can learn much from other
countries. For example, Canada has a clear immi-
gration policy which links economic needs to
immigration decisions. Every year the Canadian
Government produces an “immigration plan” which
sets the levels of immigration for the following year
(see for example, Government of Canada, 2001).
Immigration to Canada is managed and once the
plan has been set it is the responsibility of the
government departments to achieve the targets.
It is fair to say that the Scottish Executive’s Fresh
Talent Initiative may form the basis of what will
eventually be a Scottish-specific immigration policy.
Nevertheless, there is a fundamental political reality
that makes establishing such a policy extremely
difficult (if not impossible). Immigration is a
“reserved power”.  Immigration policy is a matter
for Westminster and is not the responsibility of the
devolved governments. Although the Scottish
Executive has recently obtained some “concessions”
from the Home Secretary (e.g. two year visas for
overseas students), they do not have instruments at
hand to ensure that immigrants to Scotland stay in
Scotland.
It is somewhat bizarre that the Scottish Executive
warns us that population decline/ageing is our
“number one” problem and yet at the same time
they are virtually powerless to do anything about it.
People immigrate to the United Kingdom and there
is no requirement that they must locate or stay in a
particular region. Without this conditionality (which
is at the centre of immigration policy in other
countries) then it is my view that Scotland will never
be able to attract and keep the number of immi-
grants it needs. Although the Scottish Executive
believes that it can achieve a sizeable increase in
immigration working within the current system,
such a view is not consistent with the reality of past
experience. For example, Scotland’s share of
Table 1 Population size and share of population aged 65+ in 2041 different net
migration assumptions
Net Migration Level: Zero +10,000 +20,000 +30,000 +40,000 +50,000
Population size in 2041
(millions) 4.5 4.9 5.4 5.8 6.3 6.7
Percentage of Population age 65+
in 2041 26.4% 24.4% 22.7% 21.3% 20.1% 19.0%
Notes:
 (1) Population in 2001is 5.06 million.
 (2) Share of population aged 65+ in 2001 is 15.9 percent
Population ageing and immigration policy
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international migration in the period 1992 to 2001
was 4.7 per cent, which does not compare favour-
ably with Scotland’s share of the total UK popula-
tion of about 8.5 per cent (Migration Watch, 2004).
Put bluntly, under the current system Scotland does
not receive anywhere near it’s “fair share” of people
immigrating to the UK.
What can be done working within the current
system in the short-run? As a first step, a new class
of immigrant visa could be constructed. This visa
would be conditional on the individual staying in
Scotland for a least some minimum period of time.
Research has consistently showed that the probabil-
ity of moving declines quite sharply with the length
of time an immigrant stays in a particular place.
The probability of moving is quite low after about
two years of residence. Therefore, for example, the
creation of a five-year visa, which is conditional on
staying in Scotland for this period of time, could
increase immigrant numbers to Scotland. In the
longer-run, the responsibility for immigration needs
to be transferred to the devolved governments.
It is clear that the numbers of net migrants needed
to stop population decline, and at the same time
decelerate population ageing, are not small. 50,000
net migrants per year is about one per cent of the
total Scottish population. It is not difficult to see
that managing a migration flow of this size would
present a serious challenge to the people of
Scotland and their government.  It is worth noting
that such a number may seem unrealistically large.
However, in percentage terms it is not dissimilar to
the targets set by, for example, Australia, Canada
and New Zealand—all countries that are committed
to increased immigration.
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Endnotes
1. This section is based heavily on Wright (2004).
2. For a thorough discussion of trends in Scottish
fertility see Graham and Boyle (2003).
3. For a comprehensive review of the main trends
over the last century that have shaped the
current demographic situation see Anderson
(2004).
4. The projections were performed using the
“FIVFIV” programme (see HPN Technologies
Inc., 1998) which is based “cohort component
projection method” (see Shorter, Sendek and
Bayoumy, 1995).
5. If successful, the Scottish Executive’s Fresh
Talent Initiative is expected to attract about
9,000 migrants per year. The projection based
on 10,000 net migrants provides some support
for the view that this policy should prevent the
Scottish population from  falling below 5
million in this decade.
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